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The Common Heritage of Mankind and the
Sub-Saharan African Native Land Tenure System:
A “Clash of Cultures” in the Interpretation of
Concepts in International Law?
Edwin Egede*
Abstract
The deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction and the seabed’s resources have been
declared the common heritage of mankind. There are however divergent views on
exactly what the common heritage of mankind is. Does it connote joint manage-
ment or common ownership of this spatial area? This article argues that culture is
one of the relevant factors to be considered in understanding the interpretation
given to the common heritage of mankind by sub-Saharan African states and that
the role of culture cannot be ignored in appreciating how states interpret concepts
in international law.
INTRODUCTION
The common heritage of mankind (CHM), a relatively recent and rather nebu-
lous concept under international law, has been the subject of divergent
interpretations.1 There is some debate as to whether this concept merely con-
cerns joint (or collective) management or whether it connotes communal
ownership of the spatial areas to which it is applies. Undoubtedly, these varied
interpretations are influenced by diverse factors including political, economic
and ideological differences. However, one factor that appears to be under-
emphasized in the discourse on CHM is the role of culture in influencing
the divergent interpretations. This article will use the deep seabed and subsoil
beyond national jurisdiction (the Area) and the Area’s resources (which are
both said to be CHM) as a case study, to explore the sometimes implicit role
of cultural values in the interpretation and understanding by certain states
* LLB (Hons) (Benin), BL (Lagos), LLM (Lagos), PhD (Cardiff); programme director and senior
lecturer in international law and international relations, Department of Politics, Cardiff
University, Wales. The author expresses his special thanks to Prince Emmanuel for his
support and inspiration: he is a friend who sticks closer than a brother does. All opinions
expressed and any errors, however, are solely the author’s. Email: EgedeE@cardiff.ac.uk
1 For a detailed study of the CHM concept, see: PB Payoyo Cries of the Sea: World Inequality,
Sustainable Development and the Common Heritage of Humanity (1997, Martinus Nijhoff);
K Baslar The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (1998,
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of concepts in international law and politics. This article argues that cultural
differences as to the interpretation of “ownership” are relevant to understand-
ing the lack of a common language in interpreting CHM. Specifically, the
article uses the sub-Saharan African cultural interpretation of “ownership”
of property and argues that this is crucial in appreciating the interpretation
that sub-Saharan African states give to the CHM concept. The international
relations concept of the CHM of the Area has been chosen as a case study
because it embraces the issue of “ownership” of a spatial area and its resources,
albeit in respect of a global common,2 which is a relevant issue in cultural
politics. For instance, Strathern points out that “[l]ate twentieth-century cul-
tural politics makes it impossible to separate issues of identity from claims
to the ownership of resources.”3
The article starts with a general exploration of the role of culture in states’
interpretation and understanding of concepts in international law. It then
examines Arvid Pardo’s proposal for the Area and its resources to be declared
to be CHM and the consequent United Nations (UN) CHM resolutions. The
article then explores sub-Saharan African cultural interpretation of ownership
of property and argues that this is a key factor to be taken into consideration
in appreciating the understanding and interpretation by these states of the
concept of the CHM of the Area and its resources. It ends with some
conclusions.
IS CULTURE RELEVANT IN THE INTERPRETATION AND
UNDERSTANDING OF CONCEPTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Although “culture” is commonly used in the present multicultural world, it is
a word capable of several meanings, so it is appropriate to start by explaining
what is meant by the word in this article.4 Murden points out that, wherever
human beings form communities, a culture would come into existence and
that culture may be constructed at different levels, such as village or city
locations, or across family, clan, ethnic, national, religious and other
2 SJ Buck The Global Commons: An Introduction (1998, Island Press). Other global commons
such as outer space and the moon have also been said to be CHM. Art 136 of the Law of
the Sea Convention 1982 states: “The Area and its resources are the common heritage of
mankind.” Art 1(1) defines the Area as “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”. Under art 133 the resources of the Area
are: “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath
the seabed, including polymetallic nodules” and any such resources recovered from
the Area are referred to as “minerals”.
3 M Strathern Property, Substance & Effect: Anthropological Essays on Persons and Things (1999,
Athlone) at 134.
4 See L Cao “Culture change” (2007) 47 Virginia Journal of International Law 357 at 371, citing
AL Kroeber and C Kluckholn, two influential anthropologists who, in their publication
Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (1952, Peabody Museum of American
Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University), documented more than 161 formal
definitions of the word “culture”.
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networks.5 He points out that “[c]ulture transcends ideology, and is about the
substance of identity for individuals in a society.”6 The UNESCO Universal
Declaration on Cultural Diversity 2001 (Cultural Diversity Declaration) declares
culture as the “common heritage of humanity that should be recognized and
affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations”.7 It identifies cul-
ture as “the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional fea-
tures of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art
and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and
beliefs.”8 Renteln, using the Canadian UNESCO Commission formulation and
emphasizing culture as a value system, defines it as:
“[A] dynamic value system of learned elements, with assumptions, conven-
tions, beliefs and rules permitting members of a group to relate to each
other and to the world, to communicate and to develop their creative poten-
tial. Culture, in this sense, refers to a value system or way of life. It is a
broad, all-encompassing notion that includes such things as language, reli-
gion, politics, child-rearing practices and attire.”9
The characterization of culture as a value system and way of life is adopted in
this article.
Traditionally, international law is loath to consider cultural differences in
relation to the application of law in the international community. For
instance, Oppenheim pointed out that international law “does not recognize
any distinctions in the membership of the international community based
on religious, geographical or cultural differences”.10 More recently however,
some, including the so-called French school of international law, have recog-
nized in the context of the north / south divide that disparities, especially
with regard to development, should be taken into account in understanding
5 S Murden “Culture in world affairs” in J Baylis, S Smith and P Owens (eds) The
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (4th ed, 2008,
Oxford University Press) 420.
6 Id at 420.
7 See art 1, available at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf>
(last accessed 18 June 2012). See also preamble 2 to the UNESCO Convention on the
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (Cultural
Expressions Convention), adopted 20 October 2005 and entered into force 18 March
2007, available at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf> (last
accessed 18 June 2012).
8 See preamble 5 to the Cultural Diversity Declaration. Art 4 of the Cultural Expressions
Convention states that “cultural content” refers to “the symbolic meaning, artistic
dimension and cultural values that originate from or express cultural identities”.
9 AD Renteln The Cultural Defense (2004, Oxford University Press) at 10 and AD Renteln
“Cultural bias in international law” (1998) 92 American Society of International Law
Proceedings 232 at 233.
10 R Jennings and A Watt (eds) Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol I (9th ed, 1997, Oxford
University Press) at 87.
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contemporary international law.11 There is a growing body of literature
acknowledging the role of culture in international law.12 One example is an
article written by Kunz as far back as the 1950s where, using the League of
Nations and its successor, the UN, as examples, he identified the need for
international law to be receptive to the diverse value systems in the world.
He pointed out:
“Since 1920 positive international law has recognized the pluralism of the legal
and value systems of the world, in the manner of elections to the Council of
the Legal of Nations and the United Nations Security Council, to other organs
of international organizations, in the equitable distribution, as to countries, of
international civil servants and, particularly, in the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice and now in Article 9 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, according to which ‘in that body as a whole
the representation of the main forms of civilization and the principal legal sys-
tems of the world should be assured’.”13
It would be rather extraordinary to refuse to accept or acknowledge a place for
culture in the interpretation of concepts in international law since culture,
albeit Western European culture, forms the basis of the discipline as we
know it today. According to Professor Verzijl, international law was “the pro-
duct of the conscious activity of the European mind… [and] has drawn its vital
essence from a common source of European beliefs and in both these aspects
it is mainly of Western European origin”.14 For instance, international law was
originally conceived to apply to “civilized” states and an understanding of it
was determined solely by western culture.15 Consequently, at a point in his-
tory, even highly developed empires in some parts of the world, such as
Africa and Asia, were excluded from the ambit of international law.16
11 See for example G Feuer “International development law: The establishment of a franco-
phone school of thought” (1991) 3(2) The European Journal of Development Research 70.
12 See for instance JL Kunz “Pluralism of legal and value systems and international law”
(1955) 49(3) American Journal of International Law 370; RP Anand (ed) Cultural Factors in
International Relations (1981, Shakti Malik Abhinav Publications); Renteln “Cultural
bias”, above at note 9; L Cao “Culture change”, above at note 4; P Meerts (ed) Culture
and International Law (2008, Cambridge University Press); and BS Chimni “Asian civiliza-
tions and international law: Some reflections” (2011) 1 Asian Journal of International
Law 39.
13 Id, Kunz, at 373.
14 JHW Verzijl International Law in Historical Perspective Vol I (1968, Sijhoff) at 435–36. See also
Jennings and Watt (eds) Oppenheim’s International Law, above at note 10 at 87–89.
15 A Anghie “Finding the peripheries: Sovereignty and colonialism in nineteenth century
international law” (1999) 40(1) Harvard International Law Journal 1 at 22–34.
16 TO Elias and R Akinjide Africa and the Development of International Law (2nd revised ed,
1988, Kluwer Publishers) at 3–18 and RP Anand “Attitude of the Asian-African states
toward certain problems of international law” (1966) 15 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 55 at 57–60.
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However, recent scholarship has begun to acknowledge a role for cultural
differences in international law.17
Several reasons have been given for the general failure of international law
to engage particularly with culture.18 For instance, Cao points to the fact that
international law insists that its rules are universally valid, generally aiming
for universality and not difference, and therefore a focus on culture would
tend to highlight differences.19 It is however argued that, for international
law to be truly universal, it ought to be flexible enough to embrace different
cultural values, more so in the present multicultural world.20 According to
Jessup “the effectiveness of public international law, the system without
which it would be impossible to maintain the legal relationships existing
between the various states of the world, would be seriously impaired if
there were no tolerance of certain differences stemming from various legal
systems”.21 This would of course be subject to the proviso that such values
are not harmful to what may be regarded as the common concerns of human-
ity, such as the prohibition of genocide, ethnic cleansing, torture, slave trade
and racial discrimination. It is further argued that it would not suffice if,
under the cloak of universality, international law were limited to what is a
western conception of international law. Recognition of cultural differences
in international law and the input of diverse cultural values would indeed
legitimize and justify its label as truly universal law. An appreciation that
international law now operates in a multicultural world with diverse cultural
values would lay a firm basis for an understanding that cultural differences do
play a crucial role in the interpretation and understanding of concepts under
17 Renteln “Cultural bias”, above at note 9; P Meerts (ed) Culture and International Law, above
at note 12; Cao “Culture change”, above at note 4; Anand (ed) Cultural Factors in
International Relations, above at note 12; Chimni “Asian civilizations and international
law”, above at note 12.
18 Cao, ibid.
19 Id at 371. René-Jean Dupuy, the renowned French international law scholar, is reported
to have raised the following query: “Given its cultural diversity, is it conceivable for
humanity to have a common international law?” See E Lagrange “The thoughts of
René-Jean Dupuy: Methodology or poetry of international law?” (2011) 22(2) The
European Journal of International Law 425 at 428.
20 PC Jessup “Diversity and uniformity in the law of nations” (1964) 58 American Journal
of International Law 341. The preamble to the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples 2007 affirmed that: “All peoples contribute to the diversity and rich-
ness of civilisations and cultures, which constitute the common heritage of human-
kind”. Declaration available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/
DRIPS_en.pdf> (last accessed 18 June 2012). Also, see art 1 of the Cultural Diversity
Declaration, above at note 7, which states: “Culture takes diverse forms across time and
space. This diversity is embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of the identities of the
groups and societies making up humankind. As a source of exchange, innovation and crea-
tivity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. In this
sense, it is the common heritage of humanity and should be recognized and affirmed for
the benefit of present and future generations.”
21 Id, Jessup, at 343.
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international law. Such an awareness of cultural divergence within the frame-
work of international law would promote interculturality.22 This should
require representatives of states engaged in intercultural negotiation of var-
ious aspects of international law not only to seek to understand other states’
cultural perception of the relevant concepts, but also to take steps to engage in
a dialogue with those states with a view to arriving at a common understand-
ing of such concepts. This view is supported by Dr Stuart Harris, the then sec-
retary of the Commonwealth Department of Foreign Affairs and a very
experienced diplomat. In a paper delivered at a public international law semi-
nar at the University of Sydney, he alluded to the importance of intercultural-
ity and rightly warned that a failure of western states “to understand the
cultural differences [with non-western states] which cause differing percep-
tions of private property, contract laws, dispute settlement and arbitration”
could lead to the former states being unable to arrive “at satisfactory and har-
monious arrangements” with the latter.23
There is empirical evidence, though it is perhaps rather sparse, pointing to
the fact that the issue of culture does have some relevance in other areas of
international law, even apart from international human rights where the
debate in respect of cultural relativism is well documented in the practice
of states.24 A ready example relates to the debate on whether there should
be a moratorium on whale hunting. Some states, namely Iceland, Japan and
Norway, have sought to put arguments based on culture before the
Whaling Commission, objecting to the moratorium.25 For instance, Norway,
arguing against the moratorium on whaling, declared before the Whaling
Commission that:
“Culture is important to the people whose lifestyles and diets are supported by
catching whales … substitute[ing] [other forms of red meat or fish], however,
cannot replace the traditional value of whaling claimed by many
22 Art 4, para 8 of the Cultural Expressions Convention, above at note 7, defines “intercul-
turality” as “the existence and equitable interaction of diverse cultures and the possi-
bility of generating shared cultural expressions through dialogue and mutual respect”.
23 JG Starke “International law and cultural differences between western and non-western
countries” (1985) 59 The Australian Law Journal 735 at 735. See also K Thakore “Some
recent international codification conferences and cultural interactions” in Anand (ed)
Cultural Factors in International Relations, above at note 12, 129.
24 See for example FR Teson “International human rights and cultural relativism” (1984–85)
25(4) Virginia Journal of International Law 869; J Donnelly “Cultural relativism and univer-
sal human rights” (1984) 6 Human Rights Quarterly 400; and AD Renteln “The unanswered
challenge of relativism and the consequences for human rights” (1985) 7 Human Rights
Quarterly 514.
25 See D Wagner “Competing cultural interests in the whaling debate: An exception to the
universality of the right to culture” (2004–05) 14 Transnational Law & Contemporary
Problems 831. Also, for issues arising in respect of culture and international trade law,
see M Hahn “A clash of cultures? The UNESCO Diversity Convention and international
trade law” (2006) 9(3) Journal of International Economic Law 515.
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Norwegians. Norway proclaims that whaling is a part of its cultural heritage,
and it should be allowed to pass along this tradition to future generations.
Small villagers in the Lofoten Islands … insist that they have a right to do
what their fathers did - hunt minke whales.”26
Although there are certainly difficulties in determining exactly what the rel-
evant culture actually is and isolating its precise impact in international law
and politics, that influence cannot be ignored or wished away.27 In the
author’s view these difficulties merely confirm the need to encourage more
academic works to tease out such cultural influences. Indeed, there is a
place for understanding the cultural values of states or groups of states in
order to appreciate better their interpretation and understanding of concepts
under international law. This is more so in the present multicultural world
with increasing interactions between different cultures. In his seminal piece,
“The clash of civilizations?”, written in 1993, Samuel P Huntington predicted
that, with the end of the cold war, culture, both western and non-western,
would play a crucial role in international relations. He said:
“With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western
phase, and its centrepiece becomes the interaction between the West and
non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics
of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no
longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join
the West as movers and shakers of history.”28
This article will use the case study of the CHM of the Area and the resources in
it, and African cultural appreciation of ownership, to explore the role culture
may play in understanding the interpretation of the concept of CHM by
sub-Saharan African states. However, before exploring this further it is perti-
nent to provide a brief background to how the CHM concept emerged in
relation to the Area and its resources.
COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND: ARVID PARDO’S PROPOSAL
AND THE UN RESOLUTIONS
Although the idea of CHM has been attributed to various individuals, it was
actually put at the centre stage of international law and politics by Dr Arvid
Pardo, the then Maltese ambassador to the UN. In his 1967 speech to the UN
General Assembly,29 Pardo proposed that the Area and its resources should
26 Id, Wagner, at 847.
27 Murden “Culture in world affairs”, above at note 5.
28 SP Huntington “The clash of civilizations?” (1993) 72(3) Foreign Affairs 22 at 23.
29 It has been said that the proposal for a legal regime for the deep seabed was already
in place before Arvid Pardo’s speech. See B Larschan and BC Brennan “The common
heritage of mankind principle in international law” (1982–83) Columbia Journal of
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be declared to be CHM and used for only peaceful purposes and that a legal
regime for this part of the sea should be formulated.30 The speech would
appear to have acted as a clarion call for developing states, including
African states, which constituted a qualified majority at the General
Assembly and pushed for General Assembly resolutions in respect of the
Area and its resources. The General Assembly adopted several resolutions on
this issue with rather lengthy titles, including: “Examination of the question
of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the
ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the
limits of the present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in
the interests of mankind”;31 “Question of the reservation exclusively for peace-
ful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof,
underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction,
and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind”;32 “Declaration
of principles governing the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil
thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;33 and “Reservation exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil
thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national juris-
diction and use of their resources in the interests of mankind, and convening
of a conference on the law of the sea”.34
These resolutions led to a very wide-ranging conference on the law of the
sea, the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took
place from 1973–82.35 This conference eventually culminated in the establish-
ment of the part XI regime of the Area under the Law of the Sea Convention
1982 (LOSC), subsequently modified by the 1994 Agreement relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the 1982 Convention, and the entrenchment
of the concept of CHM (albeit a rather watered down version due to the
1994 agreement) of the Area and its resources in international law.36
contd
Transnational Law 305 at 318; and NS Rembe Africa and the International Law of the Sea
(1980, Sijthoff & Noordhoff) at 36.
30 See Maltese note verbale of 17 August 1967 to the UN Secretary General (A/6695, 18
August 1967; vol II, doc 12.1) and Dr Pardo’s speech to the General Assembly’s First
Committee (A/C.1/PV.1515, 1 November 1967).
31 GA res 2340 (XXII) of 18 December 1967.
32 GA res 2574 (XXIV) of 15 December 1969.
33 GA res 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970.
34 GA res 3029 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972.
35 See M Gerstle “The politics of UN voting: A view of the seabed from the glass palace”
(occasional paper no 7, 1970, Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island); L
Henkin “Old politics and new directions” in R Churchill, KR Simmonds and J Welch
(eds) New Directions in the Law of the Sea Vol III (1973, Oceana Publications) 3 at 8–10; and
RR Churchill and AV Lowe Law of the Sea (1999, Manchester University Press) at 227–28.
36 E Brown Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime Vol 2 (2001, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers) at 23–44 and RP Anand “Common heritage of mankind: Mutilation of
an ideal” (1997) 37 Indian Journal of International Law 1.
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Common heritage of mankind: The concept
Due to the rather imprecise nature of the concept of CHM, its exact scope has
been open to diverse interpretations. Joyner, in an exploration of the concept,
identifies five principal elements of this rather intricate concept.37 First, it
deals with territories that are not subject to appropriation of any kind,
whether by public or private, national or corporate entities, and, though
owned by no-one, are managed by everyone. Secondly, all peoples (with states
acting in a representative capacity) are expected to share in the management
of the territory and therefore are to be represented in any international insti-
tution set up in this regard. Thirdly, any natural resources exploited from the
territory and any economic benefits are to be shared amongst all peoples.
Fourthly, the territory is to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Fifthly, it should be open to scientific research by any state, provided that
research does not adversely affect the environment and that the research out-
comes are made available as soon as possible to other states, which may
request them.38
Joyner, rather incredulously, further identified what he tagged as the “new
international economic order (NIEO) variant” of CHM that actually requires
full legal ownership of the Area by the international community, with devel-
oping states given preferential rights in the distribution of the revenue accru-
ing from the Area. In addition, he pointed out that the NIEO variant required
the establishment of international machinery with immense powers to serve
as trustee for the Area.39 This therefore raises the crucial question: Is CHM
merely joint management or does it also incorporate common ownership?
Common heritage of mankind: Is it joint management or common
ownership?
As far as Joyner was concerned and citing mostly western scholars, the idea of
“ownership” of the region to which it applied was legally absent under the
CHM regime.40 He asserted that, conceptually, CHM entails the principle of
non-proprietorship and that the key consideration was access to and joint
management of the region rather than ownership of it.41 This position
could arguably be said to be based on his general interpretation of “owner-
ship” from a contemporary western perspective of property ownership,
which in many ways disregards the idea of communal ownership. He was
37 CC Joyner “Legal implications of the concept of the common heritage of mankind”
(1986) 35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 190 at 191–92.
38 Ibid.
39 Id at 193.
40 Id at 194, citing A Dolman Resources, Regimes, World Order (1981, Pergamon Press) at 226–
30 and Larschan and Brennan “The common heritage of mankind principle”, above at
note 29 at 316–17. See also generally S Gorove “The concept of ‘common heritage of man-
kind’: A political, moral or legal innovation?” (1971–72) 9 San Diego Law Review 390, rais-
ing some problematic issues on the idea of ownership of the Area by mankind.
41 Joyner, ibid.
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therefore not surprisingly rather dismissive of the so-called NIEO variant,
which would necessarily entail communal ownership, because of a lack of
appreciation of other cultural interpretations of “ownership”, such as the
African cultural interpretation. Even at that, it is apposite to mention that his-
torically, though no longer prevalent in modern times, communal ownership
of landed property was also applicable in some parts of the west. For instance,
in England in the pre-Norman era, communal, rather than private individual,
ownership of land was the rule rather than the exception. It has been said that,
even during the feudal era, communal ownership of land was prevalent.42
However, over the years the preference in the west has tilted in favour of pri-
vate individual property rather than communal property, an interpretation
clearly different from Africa’s cultural interpretation of ownership. It is
argued that an inclination to a more individualistic perception of ownership
explains why scholars like Joyner are loath to accept that the concept of CHM
in any way incorporates communal ownership of the Area and its resources.
Gwartney points out that the west’s aversion to the idea of communal prop-
erty could be attributed to the western liberal value system which believes
that the promotion and protection of private individual property is intrinsi-
cally linked to the protection of individual rights and freedoms.43 He cites
James Madison who, while still a congressman from Virginia, said:
“Its [the right to own property] larger and juster meaning, it embraced [sic]
everything to which amanmay attach a value and have a right, and which leaves
to everyone else the like advantage. In the former sense, a man’s land or mer-
chandise, or money, is called property. In the latter sense, a man has a property
in his opinions and the free communication of them. He has a property of
peculiar value in his religious opinions, and in the profession and practice dic-
tated by them. He has property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of his
person. He has an equal property in the free use of his facilities, and free choice
of the objects on which to employ them. In a word, as a man is said to have a
right to his property, he may be equally said to have property in his rights.”44
It is argued that this interpretation and understanding of ownership, contrast-
ing with, for instance, the African cultural conception of ownership, indicates
why there is a lack of common language in the interpretation of the CHM con-
cept in the Area.45
42 JC Juergensmeyer and JB Wadley “The common lands concept: A ‘commons’ solution to
a common environmental problem” (1974) 14 Natural Resources Journal 361.
43 See for example J Gwartney “Private property, freedom and the West” (1985) The
Intercollegiate Review 39.
44 Id at 41, citing statement made on 27 March 1792 from The Works of James Madison, vol IV
at 478–79.
45 See K Opoku “The law of the sea and the developing countries” (1973) Revue de Droit
International de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques 28–45, cited in Rembe Africa and the
International Law, above at note 29 at 52–53.
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Ambassador Pinto, Sri Lanka’s representative at UNCLOS III, provided a
robust theoretical basis for the so-called NIEO variant, especially with regard
to full legal ownership of the Area. He said:
“The common heritage of mankind is the common property of mankind. The
commonness of the ‘common heritage’ is the commonness of the ownership
and benefit. The minerals are owned by your country and mine, and by all the
rest as well … If you touch the nodules at the bottom of the sea, you touch my
property. If you take them away, you take away my property … And so, for
many countries, the legal status of resources of the deep seabed itself forbids
mining under unilaterally developed individual or group regimes however
well-intentioned, however efficient, however designed to fit in and coalesce
with some future internationally agreed regime. For those countries the ‘com-
mon heritage’ of these resources is not ‘res nullius’ to be had for the taking; is
not ‘res communis’ simply for enjoyment or use in common; it is more akin to
property held in trust - held in trust for ‘mankind as a whole’, for the public. It
is therefore closest to ‘res publicae’, the property of the people, to be adminis-
tered by the people and for the people.”46
Further, Ambassador Bamela Engo, an African and the chairman of the First
Committee, UNCLOS III, agreeing that CHM connotes legal ownership of the
Area and its resources, said: “developing countries came to the global dialogue
determined to ensure that they were not left out of the activities in the deep
sea-bed area. For them, the common heritage concept meant indivisible ‘joint
ownership’ by mankind as a whole of legal property.”47 On the other hand, as
far back as 1972, John R Stevenson, the then legal adviser to the United States
of America State Department, stated in an address to a Congress sub-
committee: “[w]e of course continued to state – and we are supported in
this by a number of other countries – that common heritage does not
mean common property.”48
In the course of UNCLOS III, certain African states made clear statements
indicating that communal ownership in their view was a critical part of the
CHM concept. For instance, the Somali delegate, suggestive of communal own-
ership, pointed out at UNCLOS III that: “[t]he aim of the General Assembly in
46 MCW Pinto “Statement” in S Allen and JP Craven (eds) “Alternatives in deepsea mining”
(proceedings, Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, workshop, Ka’u Hawaii,
11–14 December 1978) 13 at 13–15.
47 PB Engo (1984) “Issues of the First Committee at UNCLOS III” in AW Koers and BH Oxman
(eds) “The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea” (proceedings, Law of the Sea Institute,
17th annual conference, co-sponsored by Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Oslo, Norway, 13–16
July 1983) 33 at 38.
48 Hearings before the Sub-committee on Oceanography Miscellaneous of the Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong.2d Sess.237, 242 (1972), cited in MA
Harry “The deep seabed: The common heritage of mankind or arena for unilateral
exploitation” (1992) 40 Naval Law Review 207 at 215.
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using the expression ‘common heritage of mankind’ was clear and embodied
the notion that the resources of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction belonged to all peoples and should be used for the
benefit of all.”49 In addition, the Tanzanian representative was emphatic
that the Area was “jointly owned by all mankind”50 and the representative
from Madagascar said “the international area belonged to the international
community and not to one State”.51 It is contended that the interpretation
of the CHM concept by these African states could be better understood in
the context of the African cultural perception of ownership of property.
Common heritage of mankind: Cultural influence in interpretation by
sub-Saharan African states?
There is clearly some ambiguity in the definition of CHM.52 It has been said
that this concept, which is part of international law, has at various times
been used by both developed and developing states as a “political and rhetori-
cal tool of convenience” to support what they perceived to be their interests.53
This is undoubtedly the case with the CHM of the Area and its resources, as can
be seen from the various General Assembly resolutions adopted before
UNCLOS III and the stance of the various states during the conference.
Indeed, developing states were interested in using this concept as an instru-
ment of “wealth transfer” to achieve the goals of the NIEO. They no doubt per-
ceived that legal ownership of the Area by the international community as a
whole, with preferential rights for developing states and a strong international
organization to regulate the Area’s exploitation, would best serve the interests
of developing states and also prevent developed states with the financial and
technological wherewithal from unilaterally exploiting these resources. For
instance, the representative from Congo at UNCLOS III suggested that the
General Assembly resolution declaring the Area to be CHM was “to close
the current gap between developed and developing countries.”54 Further,
the Nigerian representative at the 22nd session of the General Assembly
declared:
“[I]t is our view that the known resources of the seabed and ocean floor, which
are vast, should, as far as they lie outside the limits of present national
49 UNCLOS III official records, vol I, 186, para 52.
50 Id, vol II, 33, para 36.
51 Id, vol II, 59, para 78.
52 Gorove “The concept of ‘common heritage of mankind’”, above at note 40.
53 I Mgbeoji “Beyond rhetoric: State sovereignty, common concern, and the inapplicability
of the common heritage concept to plant genetic resources” (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of
International Law 821 at 826. See also Larschan and Brennan “The common heritage of
mankind principle”, above at note 29 at 320–26 for an interesting general analysis
of the positions taken by both developed and developing states at UNCLOS III on the
application of the concept to the resources of the sea.
54 UNCLOS III official records, vol II, 35, para 65.
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jurisdiction, be exploited collectively for the sole benefit of the world commu-
nity. As a developing country Nigeria’s renewed fear is of the incalculable dan-
gers for mankind as a whole if the seabed and the ocean floor beyond present
national jurisdiction were progressively and competitively appropriated,
exploited and even used for military purposes by those countries which pos-
sess the necessary technology.”55
The ideological, political and economic interest of the various states certainly
plays a vital role in the divergent interpretations of CHM. However, the diver-
gence in cultural perspectives cannot be ignored in explaining why African
states, especially sub-Saharan states, were more inclined to interpret CHM as
incorporating the idea of common property, rather than mere joint manage-
ment. In her very interesting book, Travelling Concepts in the Humanities, Bal
points out that “no text yields meaning outside the social world and cultural
makeup of the reader”.56 Relying on the argument of enculturation,57 Renteln
points out “that culture shapes cognition and conduct. Because culture
strongly influences human motivations, the legal system should take cultural
imperatives into account”.58 It is argued that African states, which have
become enculturated to communal ownership of land, are more inclined to
interpret CHM as connoting common ownership of property of the Area
and its resources. This contrasts with western developed states which, by
their cultural inclination to individualism or individual ownership of prop-
erty, would regard the idea of CHM being common property as problematic.59
Renteln had pointed out the difficulties in attributing the interpretation of
international law to cultural factors due to the complications of actually dis-
cerning the influence of culture in the position a state or some states take
on matters of international law. Nonetheless, she admitted that there was
empirical evidence, albeit limited, that lends credence to the stance that
such influence could exist consciously or unconsciously.60 In the case of
Africa, there is evidence of state practice which indicates that culture does
influence the stance of African states in respect of international law. A review
of some conventions adopted by the Organisation of African Unity and its suc-
cessor, the African Union, points towards an influence of culture in Africa’s
perception of various areas of international law. For instance, in international
human rights, preamble 6 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
55 Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office The Law of the Sea, Concept of the
Common Heritage of Mankind, Legislative History of Articles 133 to 150 and 311(6) of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1996, UN) at 14.
56 M Bal Travelling Concepts in Humanities: A Rough Guide (1946, University of Toronto Press)
at 8.
57 This is a process by which a person or group of people adapt to and assimilate the
culture in which they live.
58 Renteln The Cultural Defense, above at note 9 at 6.
59 Gorove “The concept of ‘common heritage of mankind’”, above at note 40.
60 Renteln “Cultural bias”, above at note 9.
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the Child states: “[t]aking into consideration the virtues of their cultural heri-
tage, historical background and the values of African Civilization which
should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of the rights
and welfare of the child”.61 In respect of the international environmental
law on the conservation of nature and natural resources, preamble 3 of the
African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
states: “[f]ully conscious of the ever-growing importance of natural resources
from an economic, nutritional, scientific, educational, cultural and aesthetic
point of view”. Further, in respect of international refugee law on the treat-
ment of internally displaced persons, preamble 3 of the African Union
Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons
in Africa states: “[r]eiterating the inherent African custom and tradition of hos-
pitality by local host communities for persons in distress and support for such
communities”.
The African interpretation of the concept of “peoples” is apparent under, for
example, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter),
a unique human rights treaty that takes into consideration the rather commu-
nal nature of African society, reflecting African cultural values.62 Kiwanuka
points out that, though the concept of “peoples” was not a novel concept in
international law, its interpretation under the African Charter was different
from the western perspective.63 He states that: “[p]eoples’ rights in the
Banjul [African] Charter are the embodiment of the African conception and
philosophy of a person in society. In Africa, a person is not regarded as ‘an iso-
lated and abstract individual, but an integral member of a group animated by
a spirit of solidarity’.”64
Another example of the communal nature of the African cultural percep-
tion of human rights is reflected by the inclusion of CHM in the African
Charter as a human right. Article 22(1) of the charter declares: “[a]ll peoples
shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with
due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the
common heritage of mankind.” Even though the exact intended legal signifi-
cance of this provision is not very clear, the provision nevertheless emphasizes
the collective nature of aspects of human rights under the African Charter,
61 See: BO Okere “The protection of human rights in Africa and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights: Comparative analysis with the European and American sys-
tems” (1984) 6 Human Rights Quarterly 141; M Mutua “The Banjul Charter and the African
cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of the language of duties” (1994–95) 35 Virginia
Journal of International Law 339; and RT Nhlapo “International protection of human
rights and the family: African variations on a common theme” (1989) 3 International
Journal of Law and the Family 1.
62 M Mutua and E Egede “Bringing human rights home: An examination of the domesti-
cation of human rights treaties in Nigeria” (2007) 51(2) Journal of African Law 249.
63 RN Kiwanuka “The meaning of ‘people’ in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights” (1988) 82(1) American Journal of International Law 80.
64 Id at 82 and see Okere “The protection of human rights”, above at note 61 at 148.
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embracing third generation solidarity rights.65 In contrast, Gorove, obviously
enculturated to western cultural values that view human rights as restricted to
individual first generation civil and political rights, could not fathom the
possibility of CHM as part of human rights. He argued:
“[M]ankind as a concept should be distinguished from that of man in general.
The former refers to the collective body of people, whereas the latter stands for
the individuals making up that body. Therefore, the rights of mankind should
be distinguished, for instance, from the so-called human rights. Human rights
are rights which individuals are entitled to on the basis of their belonging to
the human race, whereas the rights of mankind relate to the rights of the col-
lective entity and would not be analogous with the rights of individuals mak-
ing up that entity.”66
This disparity in western and African cultural values on whether CHM can be
regarded as part of human rights merely emphasizes the importance of cul-
ture in understanding the interpretation of concepts in other aspects of inter-
national law.
While the influence of culture certainly cannot be the sole factor to con-
sider in determining the stance of states towards concepts in international
law, such as the CHM concept, it undoubtedly has some significance in under-
standing the interpretation of such concepts by these states and should not be
disregarded. The next section will explore African cultural interpretation of
“ownership” of land and argue that this is a crucial factor in understanding
what CHM actually is.
Common heritage of mankind and the sub-Saharan African native
land tenure system
A key feature of sub-Saharan African cultural values is their communal nature.
Consequently, there are African proverbs, such as the popular “[i]t takes a vil-
lage (or a community) to raise a child,” reflecting so to speak the collective,
rather than individual, social responsibility of African culture.67 Jandt ident-
ified this collective or communal feature as one of Africa’s shared cultural
values by pointing out that “African people pattern social interactions and
communities after the presumed existence of natural rhythms. Neither ‘I’
nor ‘we’ have meaning apart from the other. What happens to one affects
the entire community, and what happens to the community affects all as
65 SP Marks “Emerging human rights: A new generation for the 1980s?” (1980–81) 33
Rutgers Law Review 435 at 435; P Alston “A third generation of solidarity rights:
Progressive development or obfuscation of international human rights law?” (1982) 29
Netherlands International Law Review 307; and C Wellman “Solidarity, the individual and
human rights” (2000) 23(3) Human Rights Quarterly 639.
66 Gorove “The concept of ‘common heritage of mankind’”, above at note 40 at 393.
67 J Cowen-Fletcher It Takes a Village (1994, Scholastic Press).
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individuals.”68 This communal feature is incorporated into the sub-Saharan
African cultural perception of “ownership”. Communal ownership of prop-
erty, though not prevalent in most developed states, as mentioned above is
a familiar concept to sub-Saharan African states. In these African states,
under native law and customs, land is generally not subject to individual own-
ership, but rather communal ownership by the family, village or commu-
nity.69 Individual ownership appears to have been introduced because of
contact with Europeans. Judge Teslim Elias, the eminent international law jur-
ist and authority on African native law and custom, pointed out that the uni-
versality on the African continent of the concept of communal ownership of
property both in “Sudanese or Bantu” Africa was a confirmed fact.70 Further,
Ollennu and Woodman quoted an African chief who, affirming the commu-
nal nature of African land ownership under native law and custom, stated: “I
conceive that land belongs to a vast family of whom many are dead, a few are
living and countless hosts are still unborn.”71 Further, in the Privy Council
case of Amodu Tijani v Secretary, Government of Southern Nigeria, Lord Haldane
endorsed the communal nature of property ownership under native land
law in Africa and quoted with approval Rayner CJ’s report on land tenure in
West Africa, as follows:
“The next fact which it is important to bear in mind in order to understand
the native land law is that the notion of individual ownership is quite foreign
to native ideas. Land belongs to the community, the village or the family, never
to the individual. All the members of the community, village, or head of the
family have an equal right to the land, but in every case the chief or headman
of the community or village or head of the family, has charge of the land, and
in loose mode of speech is sometimes called the owner. He is to some extent in
the position of a trustee, and as such holds the land for the use of the commu-
nity or family. He has control of it, and any member who wants a piece of it to
cultivate or build a house upon, goes to him for it. But the land so given still
remains the property of the community or family. He cannot make any impor-
tant disposition of the land without consulting the elders of the community or
the family, and their consent must in all cases be given before a grant can be
made to a stranger.”72
68 FE Jandt An Introduction to Intercultural Communication: Identities in a Global Community (4th
ed, 2004, Sage) at 391–92.
69 I Potekhin “Land relations in African countries” (1963) 1(1) The Journal of Modern African
Studies 39 and K Akuffo “The conception of land ownership in African customary law and
its implications for development” (2009) 17 African Journal of International and
Comparative Law 57.
70 TO Elias The Nature of African Customary Law (1956, Manchester University Press) at 162.
71 NA Ollennu and GR Woodman (1985) Ollennu’s Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana
(1985, CAL Press) at 7.
72 [1921] 2 AC 399 at 404–05.
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Although it is rather difficult for scholars from certain parts of the world to
appreciate the concept of communal ownership because individual owner-
ship of landed property is infused in the value system they are used to, for
others from a background where cultural values embrace communal owner-
ship of landed property there is nothing peculiar about this. For the latter
scholars, the so-called NIEO variant of the CHM concept,73 whereby the Area
and its resources are commonly owned by the international community,
would form a critical element of the concept.74
There would appear to be a rather interesting parallel between the commu-
nal ownership of land in Africa and the CHM of the Area.75 The community or
family under native law and custom jointly own the land. Any member of the
community or the family, as the case may be, wishing to use the communal
land may apply to the head and have no more than usufructuary rights.
Ownership of the land, however, at every point, remains vested in the commu-
nity or family, with the head of the community or family acting as a type of
trustee for this communal land.76 This can be equated with the situation
under CHM where the International Seabed Authority (ISA) acts as trustee of
the Area and its resources for the benefit of mankind. The Kenyan representa-
tive at UNCLOS III requested that the ISA be “designated as the trustee of man-
kind” for activities in the Area.77 The activities in the Area are to be organized,
carried out and controlled by the ISA on behalf of mankind as a whole.78 Any
states parties to the LOSC or states enterprises, or natural or juridical persons
which possess the nationality of states parties or are effectively controlled by
them or their nationals, when sponsored by such states or any group of the
foregoing upon application to the ISA only have usufructuary rights to carry
out activities in the Area.79
It could be argued that “ownership” of the Area and its resources by the
international community is perhaps the basis for the establishing the rather
complex international machinery to administer the Area, with the ISA having
a role as a sort of trustee akin to that of the chief or headman of the commu-
nity or village, or heads of the family in the case of sub-Saharan African native
land tenure. The communal ownership of the Area and its resources is argu-
ably implicit in article 137 of the LOSC, which states:
“1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any
part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical
73 Joyner “Legal implications of the concept”, above at note 37 at 191–92.
74 Egede Africa and the Deep Seabed Regime, above at note 1 at 65–66.
75 Rembe Africa and the International Law of the Sea, above at note 29 at 53.
76 B Dunning “A comparative study of legal ideology: African land tenure systems” (1990) 10
Third World Law Journal 297 at 302.
77 UNCLOS III official records, vol I, 84, para 57.
78 LOSC, art 153, para 1.
79 Id, paras 2 and 3.
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person appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sover-
eignty or sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized.
2. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on
whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not subject to
alienation. The minerals recovered from the Area, however, may only be
alienated in accordance with this Part and the rules, regulations and pro-
cedures of the Authority.
3. No State or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise
rights with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except in
accordance with this Part. Otherwise, no such claim, acquisition or exer-
cise of such rights shall be recognized.”
In addition, it argued that the communal nature is also implicit in the require-
ment that activities in the Area should be carried out for the benefit of all
mankind as a whole.80
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the interpretation of the CHM concept by certain
African states as connoting common property rather than mere joint manage-
ment is influenced by their cultural values which embrace the idea of the
communal ownership of property. The idea of communal ownership may
be objectionable to some, especially those from a western cultural persuasion,
who insist that CHM merely connotes joint management since they perceive
ownership of land in terms of individualized ownership. However, to those
familiar with sub-Saharan African native land tenure and other cultures that
incorporate communal ownership of landed property in their domestic sys-
tem, there is nothing unusual about the Area and its resources being common
property. It has been argued in this article that the cultural variance of states
plays a role in states’ interpretation and understanding of concepts in inter-
national law and a “clash of cultures” could lead to divergent interpretations
of the same concept.81 Consequently, the cultural nuance of a state is a crucial
factor to take into consideration in understanding how it interprets concepts
in international law.
In conclusion, let it be clear that the purpose of this article is not to advance
the position that any particular culture should take precedence over any other
in the interpretation of concepts in international law. Rather, it seeks to point
out that an understanding of the role of culture would be helpful in promot-
ing interculturality in the interpretation of concepts in international law.
80 Id, art 140.
81 Huntington “The clash of civilizations?”, above at note 28.
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